Impact of meta-roles on the evolution of organisational institutions by Sedigh, Amir Hosein Afshar et al.
Impact of meta-roles on the evolution of
organisational institutions
Amir Hosein Afshar Sedigh1, Martin K. Purvis1, Bastin Tony Roy
Savarimuthu1, Maryam A. Purvis1, and Christopher K. Frantz2
1 Department of Information Science, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand
2 Department of Computer Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology,
Ametyst-bygget, A205, Gjøvik, Norway amir.afshar@postgrad.otago.ac.nz
{martin.purvis,tony.savarimuthu,maryam.purvis}@otago.ac.nz
christopher.frantz@ntnu.no
Abstract. This paper investigates the impact of changes in agents’ be-
liefs coupled with dynamics in agents’ meta-roles on the evolution of in-
stitutions. The study embeds agents’ meta-roles in the BDI architecture.
In this context, the study scrutinises the impact of cognitive dissonance
in agents due to unfairness of institutions. To showcase our model, two
historical long-distance trading societies, namely Armenian merchants of
New-Julfa and the English East India Company are simulated. Results
show how change in roles of agents coupled with specific institutional
characteristics leads to changes of the rules in the system.
Keywords: Institutions · BDI · Agent-based simulation · Meta-roles ·
Cognitive dissonance
1 Introduction
Employing evolutionary methods to study economic change has attracted several
scholars. For instance, Nelson and Winter proposed the idea that “organisational
routines” are pivotal in the evolution of business firms (i.e. their role is similar
to the role of the genes in biological evolution) [28]. Also, they suggested that
“[metaphorically] [r]outines are the skills of an organisation.” However, differ-
ent scholars suggested various definitions of routines. For instance, Feldman and
Pentland called “a repetitive, recognizable pattern of interdependent actions,
involving multiple actors”, a routine [16]. Routines have similarities with insti-
tutions (e.g. ‘the rules of the game’ [25]), in terms of their collective attributes
[8] (i.e. they have rule-like conditions [23]). However, whether routines are sub-
consciously followed (they are simple rules) or they are open to amendments and
changes (they are ambiguous rules) is subject of controversy [7]. Hodgson [23]
criticised Nelson and Winter’s [28] method and pointed to some shortcomings
such as not considering ‘birth’ and ‘death’ in their method.
Also, in computer science, role/meta-role based frameworks were developed
to facilitate modelling. For instance, Riehle and Gross [29] developed a role
modelling approach ‘to describe the complexity of object collaborations.’ Also,
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MetaRole-Based Modelling Language (RBML) was expressed in the Unified
Modeling Language (UML) to describe patterns’ attributes [18]. The CKSW
(Commander–textitKnowledge–Skills–Worker) framework was proposed for meta-
role modelling in agent-based simulation [27]. The idea of integrating roles and
institutions is already studied in the context of multi-agent systems. For instance,
nested ADICO refined Ostrom’s grammar of institutions [13] by differentiating
between roles (e.g. enforcer and monitoring agent) [19].
The BDI (beliefs-desires-intention) model is a cognitive agent architecture
[9] with some extensions, including the BOID [10], EBDI [26] and the BRIDGE
[14] models. This architecture was employed to model agents’ cooperation in
institutionalised multi-agent systems [5,6].
In light of earlier studies, this paper integrates agents’ meta-roles [27] in the
BDI architecture and also employs the theory of planned behaviour TPB [17]
to model different facets of beliefs. The integrated model is used to investigate
how dynamics in agents meta-roles may lead to the evolution of organisational
institutions. Meta-roles in this work are modelled using the CKSW framework
that helps modellers to decompose agents in a society based on the character-
istics of their roles [27]. The coupling of the CKSW framework within a BDI
architecture is investigated in the context of rule-making and -following (how
rules are established, interpreted, and followed).
2 An overview of the extended BDI architecture
This extended BDI cognitive architecture is shown in Figure 1. It can be ob-
served that there are two separate blocks, a left block called ‘Events’ and a right
block called ‘Cognitive architecture’. The Events block represents the events
an agent perceives from the environment (e.g. information collected from peers).
The Cognitive architecture block represents an agent’s cognitive decision-making
components. Note that when an action is performed by an agent, it will be an
input event for those agents interested in that event in the next iteration. A
brief description of the four high-level components is provided below. It should
be noted that the main focus of this paper is on the addition of Role component
to the BDI architecture (highlighted in green in Figure 1).
– Roles: An agent has a set of roles in society regarding established institu-
tions (e.g. agents make those institutions or they monitor their implemen-
tations). An agent’s role impacts its beliefs, based on individual and social
experiences (e.g. it personally may find the rule unfair). We discuss this
module in more detail in Section 3.
– Beliefs: To model beliefs, we are inspired by the idea of different belief
components of TPB [17]. This component indicates an agent’s perception
about the rule and the support the rule has. In other words, an agent has its
own internal belief about the rule, and also the perception about the social
support for that rule (e.g. rebuking the rule), and an estimation of what an
organisation meant by the rule (e.g. consequences of minor violation).
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Fig. 1. Proposed cognitive architecture for this model.
– Desires: Agents have different desires, such as an agent’s goals and ideal
preferences.
– Intentions and decision: An agent’s intentions for an action and its deci-
sion about the final action is formed in this module. The decision results in
an action which can be a modification of beliefs and roles or only performing
a task.
3 Meta-roles and role dynamics
To model agents’ roles and their interactions we use CKSW meta-roles [27]. Note
that CKSW is a generic model and since this paper concerns the rule-making
and rule-following context, we reinterpret those roles in this context as follows:
– Commander (C): This role is empowered with ultimate authority [27]. In
this context, they are the agents who are permitted to make or revise rules.
– Knowledge (K): This role concerns the know-what aspect of a society [27].
In this context, these are agents who monitor and report the suspicious
activities of others.
– Skills (S): This role concerns agents who are known for their skills in society
(know-how). Unlike knowledge, skills are difficult to communicate and much
more so to apply [27]. In the rules context, those agents that have the skills
to interpret the rules judge reported agents’ activities.
– Worker (W): These agents perform basic jobs that do not require specialist
skills [27]. In this context, they are agents who do not formally collaborate
in monitoring, establishing, or interpreting the rules (i.e. the rest of agents).
We also consider two categories of roles, formal roles and informal roles:
– Formal roles: these roles are defined based on the agent’s position in an
organisation (one of CKSW meta-roles).
– Informal (internalised) roles: these roles are unofficially and self-assigned
(e.g. based on values) by agents such as monitoring, and reporting suspicious
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behaviours of other agents to managers. These are the role(s) that an agent
may perform in addition to its formal role (one or more out of the CKSW
meta-roles).
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Fig. 2. Transition of formal meta-roles and internalising informal meta-roles — the
circles indicate roles that an agent really performs (including internalised roles), and
the bigger fonts indicate more involvement in such a role. The arrows indicate the
possible transitions in a society.
Figure 2 depicts how an agent’s meta-role may evolve3. In this example, a
worker (say clerk) of an organisation may be promoted to a higher rank after
demonstrating competence for such a promotion (say to a manager, a knowledge-
based role). If the manager has relevant education, skills and experience, it can
be promoted to an even higher position. In these positions, the manager may be
responsible for interpreting the situation and deciding about who to fire or hire
(i.e. promotion from Knowledge role to the role of a judge (skill) — represented
as SK in the figure). Under certain conditions an agent (Knowledge or Skill)
can be promoted to director role (i.e. to the Commander). Note that judges
(highlighted in blue) might not be explicitly present on an organisational level
for various reasons (e.g. sometimes legal cases go to international courts).
In Figure 2, the initials for formal roles are indicated on top or bottom of each
agent (e.g. K1) and the list of all roles for an agent (i.e. informal and formal roles)
are shown in circles placed near the agents. The font sizes of initials inside these
circles indicate the involvement level in such a role, with larger fonts involving
more involvement. The involvement is influenced by the ability of an agent to
3 Note that most times agents are downgraded for economic issues or bad performance
of agents, and this downgrading can be considered as an extension of this model.
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perform a role, as well as the perceived importance of performing such roles
from an individual agent’s perspective. For instance, some worker agents may
adopt additional informal roles in a company (e.g., k for agent W2). Some worker
agents may monitor other agents or they may have a charismatic personality and
informally establish rules (i.e. norms) which are executed by the help of other
agents (see internalised roles of W1). Another example is the case of a knowledge
agent who may adopt the informal judging role voluntarily (note the addition of
S to K2’s formal current role K). Note this agent could adopt the monitoring role
for various reasons (e.g. to help stabilise the rule or to weaken the rule-following
by not reporting the violators).
Another example is the commanders who may also take additional roles such
as K and S (e.g. C1). They may take some informal roles to influence rule change.
For instance, even though they may establish a rule, they may feel that they do
not have the obligation to follow them and so they may overlook them, hence
impacting rule-following for the whole society. These examples described above
show how formal and informal roles can shape rule changes in an organisation.
4 Simulation, algorithms, and parameters
In this section, first, we discuss the underlying assumptions of this simulation.
Then, we provide an overview of two historical societies studied for simulation,
namely the English East India Company (EIC) and Armenian merchants of
New-Julfa (Julfa). Then we briefly discuss the aspects of these societies that are
of interest for us and the simulation procedures used to represent their agents’
behaviour in the simulation context.
4.1 Assumptions
In societies, the rules that exist may not be honoured by agents. Although, the
agents know the existence of such rules, they don’t follow them and the agents
justify this behaviour through the resolution of cognitive dissonance. Cognitive
dissonance is defined as tensions formed by conflicts between different cogni-
tions (for instance, one likes to smoke, but loathes to get cancer) [3]. These ten-
sions lead to creating some justification for taking one action (quit smoking or
continuing). This idea was used to attribute workers’ productivity to cognitive
dissonance regarding fairness of institutions [2]. In particular, studies showed
that procedural justice (having fair dispute resolution mechanisms) increases
public law obedience and cooperation with the police [32]. Also, underpaid or
overpaid persons alter their efforts put forth on the system (e.g. efforts or vol-
untarily performed tasks) to make the system fairer for themselves [1]. In this
work, we consider that agents justify the need for rule change (or don’t follow
rules), because they need to resolve this cognitive dissonance (i.e. they justify
not following rules, or the reason to keep following the rules).
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4.2 Societies
As stated earlier, in this paper, we investigate two long-distance trading societies,
namely Armenian merchants of New-Julfa (Julfa) and the East India Company
(EIC). The two societies were contemporaneous and shared the same areas for
trading products (e.g. the EIC managers granted Julfans permissions for using
the EIC infrastructures [4]). Also, both societies faced principal-agent problem
[24] — the dilemma where the self-interested decisions of a party (agent) im-
pact the benefits of the other person on whose behalf these decisions are made
(principal).
Armenian merchants of New-Julfa (Julfa): Armenian merchants of
New-Julfa were originally from old Julfa in Armenia. They re-established a trader
society in New-Julfa (near Isfahan, Iran) after their forced displacement in the
early 17th century [22,4]. They used commenda contracts (profit-sharing con-
tracts) in the society and also used courts to resolve disputes [22,4].
The English East India Company (EIC): During the same time, the EIC
(AD 1600s-1850s) had a totally different perspective on managing the society.
The EIC faced a high mortality rate due to environmental factors in India.
EIC paid fixed wages and fired agents based on their own beliefs about their
trading behaviour. Furthermore, EIC’s trading period covers the English Civil
War (1642–1651), which led to inclusion of some of the senior mangers on the
board of directors and granting permission for private trade to the employees
(i.e. trading activities for individuals’ self-interests).
In both of these societies agents’ meta-roles changed over time. More precisely
in EIC, a mercantile or trader agent (W) after gaining experience was promoted
to a managerial position to monitor other mercantile agents (K). Also, in EIC,
after the English Civil War, managers had the opportunity to be part of the
board of directors (C). In Julfa, the promotions took place based on the ageing
of the family members (i.e. agents got promoted from one meta-role to the other
gradually). Additionally, in Julfa mercantile agents (W) and heads of families (C)
formed the courts (S). In this model, we use the EIC dynamics in organisational
meta-roles (i.e. promotion of agents) to make the two systems comparable. Note
that this change in dynamics decreases the opportunities for Julfans to revise
their rules. However, we know that the rules were deeply honoured by Julfans
[4].
Environment: These societies had different mortality rates. On average an
EIC agent died before the age of 35 due to harsh environmental circumstances
[20]. Julfan traders did not face such a situation [4] and the closed trading society
of Julfa would have collapsed under a high mortality rate [30].
Fairness: Another difference between the two historical long-distance trad-
ing societies is associated with their payment schemes for employees and the
adjudication processes (i.e. use of courts for resolving disputes about suspicious
behaviour). EIC rarely employed an adjudication process (e.g. agents were fired
based on their performance because of suspected cheating), and the agents were
paid low wages [21]. However, in Julfa a mercantile agent was paid based on his
performance [4]. Julfans had adjudication processes to resolve disputes, which
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considered available evidence [4]. Though Julfa appears to be fairer than EIC in
terms of payment, total fairness can be questioned — for instance, in the Julfa
society, the family wealth and trade was managed and controlled by the eldest
brother [22]. This rule deprived younger ones from managing their own share of
capital.
4.3 Algorithms
In this subsection, we discuss the procedures employed to simulate role changes
within the two societies. The simulation model is split into four distinctive proce-
dures. The first procedure models the societal level of simulation, including cre-
ating an initial population and staffing (hiring new mercantile agents) to create
a stable population. The second level describes procedures for mercantile agents’
(W) decision-making and learning the system’s parameters. The third level cov-
ers the decision-making and learning procedure associated with managers (K).
The last procedure is the meta-algorithm that sequentially executes the afore-
mentioned algorithms and updates appropriate parameters. In this algorithm,
agent meta-roles may change and the opportunity for institutional dynamics is
provided (i.e. promotion of K agents to C and changes in institutions).
Algorithm 1: Societal level set-up and initialisation
/* Intialise the system starting with iteration← 0. */
1 Create 500 new agents with status← new, random personality aspects, and
random parameters
2 Assign appropriate roles (i.e. mercantile, managers, and directors) to created
agents
/* n = deceased and fired agents (mercantile agents and managers) in
the previous iteration. */
3 The most experienced mercantile agents get promoted to a managerial role
4 Create n new agents with: status← new, Experiene← 0, and randomly
initialise parameters
/* Perceived environment and fairness for inexperienced agents. */
5 PEnvironment← RandomUniform(0, 1)
6 Fair ← RandomUniform(0, 1)
Algorithm 1 shows how the societal level of the system is simulated. In
iteration 0, the system is initialised by creating 500 new agents with random pa-
rameters (line 1). The roles are assigned to created agents (about 2% directors,
5% managers, and the rest mercantile agents).4 The organisation hires and pro-
motes agents to sustain the number of agents per role — i.e. replaces deceased
agents (lines 3-4). The rest of the algorithm is executed only for inexperienced
agents (i.e. new recruits). An agent has a completely random understanding of
the system’s characteristics (lines 5-6).
4 These numbers are inspired from the numbers in the EIC [20].
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Algorithm 2: Mercantile agent’s algorithm (for meta-role W)
/* Update parameters for new recruits. */
1 if Status = New then Set agent’s parameter using Algorithm. 1
2 if Experience > 3 then
/* Update role and the decision to perform private trade. */
3 if Dissonance(Fair) < DissonThresh then
/* Agent stops monitoring violations. */
4 Remove K from voluntarily performed roles
5 if
((
Fair < thresh
)
or(No. PrivateTraderFriends
No. Friends
< JustifThresh
))
then
/* Agent decides to perform private trade. */
6 PrivateTrade← OK
7 end
8 end
/* Agent voluntarily collaborates in monitoring. */
9 if Dissonance(Fair) > DissonThresh then Voluntarily perform K
10 end
/* learning; */
11 if Experience > 3 then
/* Reporting observed violations; */
12 if Voluntarily performing K then
/* The agent reports some of the cheaters observed. */
13 Agent reports connections who impose more costs on the organisation
than his tolerance (internalised S).
14 end
15 end
16 Learn parameters and adjust the beliefs about rules
17 Experience← Experience + 1
18 if Rand(1) ≤MortalityProbability(Experience + 15) then Die
Algorithm 2 shows the procedure associated with mercantile agents’ decision-
making process. Note that in this algorithm #Rnd(x) indicates a random num-
ber generated in the interval (0, x). As stated earlier, if the status of the mer-
cantile agent is new, he goes through an initialisation (see Algorithm 1, lines
3-4). Furthermore, experienced mercantile agents decide on their participation
in monitoring by considering cognitive dissonance incurred (based on their per-
ception of institutional fairness and dissonance toleration). They also decide on
performing private trade with respect to the perceived fairness and their friends
who perform such trades (lines 3-7). If the mercantile agent has enough experi-
ence and has already decided to collaborate in monitoring, he helps the system to
identify violators, based on his interpretation of a fair action (lines 8-9). Finally,
the mercantile agent updates his perception of system parameters (e.g. fairness
of the society), increases his experience, and may die (lines 10-12).
Algorithm 3 shows the procedures associated with managers (i.e. moni-
toring agents (K)). A manager creates a set that consists of reported violators
with unacceptable violations (i.e. he tolerates violations to some extent, see line
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Algorithm 3: Manager’s algorithm (for meta-role K)
/* Manager reports (and eventually punishes) a number of employees
who violate the rules of the organisation beyond its tolerance
level. We call the threshold TolPunish. */
1 PotPunish← employees with violations more than TolPunish
2 if The number of members of PotPunish > MaxPunish then
/* The manager has a limit for the number of agents he can punish
called MaxPunish. */
3 Punish MaxPunish out of PotPunish that have the most violation
4 else
5 Punish all PotPunish members.
6 end
7 Experience← Experience + 1
8 if Rand(1) ≤MortalityProbability(Experience + 15) then Die
1). Note that the manager reports about the violators and punishes a certain
number. If the number of violators exceeds a certain threshold, he punishes the
worst violators (lines 2-3). Otherwise, all the violators are punished (lines 4-5).
Finally, the agent’s experience and age increase, and the agent may die (lines
6-7).
Algorithm 4: Meta algorithm
/* Intialise the system starting with iteration← 0. */
1 Create 500 new agents with status← new and random parameters with
appropriate roles
/* Call algorithms in an appropriate sequence. */
2 repeat
3 Run Algorithm 1
4 Run Algorithm 2
5 Run Algorithm 3
6 if iteration = 70 then
7 Update board of directors (C) with new managers
8 if majority support private trade then legalise private trade and reduce
wages
9 end
10 iteration← iteration + 1
11 until iteration = 250
Algorithm 4 is the main algorithm that calls the other procedures. In it-
eration 0, the system is initialised by creating 500 new agents with random
parameters. The roles are assigned to created agents (2% directors (C), 5%
managers (K), and the rest are mercantile agents (W)), and they have 0 years of
experience (line 1). Then, 250 iterations corresponding to 250 years, containing
specific steps (lines 3-9) are performed (250). The first step is to run the societal
algorithm (i.e. Algorithm 1, line 3). Then the algorithm associated with the mer-
cantile agents is run (i.e. Algorithm 2). Finally, the manager’s decisions are made
10 A. H. Afshar Sedigh et al.
using Algorithm 3 (line 5). When the simulation reaches the year that some of
the managers in the EIC (who started as mercantile agents) are promoted to
the board of directors (i.e. consequences of the English Civil War, iteration 70),
a decision about permitting (or legalising) private trade is made (lines 6-8).
4.4 Parameters
In this subsection, we discuss the important parameters employed in the simula-
tion (see Table 1), along with the reasons for choosing specific values for them.
Note that we used 250 iterations to reflect the longevity of EIC (it was active
with some interruptions and changes in power from 1600 to 1850). In Table 1,
column ‘Name’ indicates the names of parameters, column ‘Comment’ shows ad-
ditional information if required, column ‘Distribution’ indicates the probability
distribution used for these parameters, and column ‘Values’ indicates the values
of parameters estimated for the two societies. Note that these parameters can
be modified to reflect other societies.
Table 1. Parameters associated with the model
Variable name Comment Distribution Values
Fairness Unfair : Fair Constant −0.4 : 0.6
Perception of environment
and fairness of system
Uniform (−1, 1)
Thresholds
Dissonance
Environment
Fired agents
Uniform
(0, 1)
(0, 1)
(0, 0.3)
Monitoring Boolean Bernoulli 0.5
Permission for private
trade
Percent of joined managers
who agreed to change
Constant 70%
Fairness: Note that as discussed earlier, Julfa had fairer institutions than
the EIC. We set system fairness values to 0.6 and -0.4 for fair and unfair societies
respectively. We believe that neither of these two societies were totally fair or
unfair (e.g. EIC managers justified the firing of agents that indicates there has
some effort towards fairness).
Perceived characteristics: Because of lack of prior experience, the new
agents have a totally random understanding of social characteristics.
Thresholds: These are the numbers that reflect an agent’s tolerance of differ-
ent aspects and characteristics of the system. All these thresholds are generated
at random except for firing. For the proportion of fired agents, we assume that
a manager would fire 30% of the suspected employees.
Monitoring: In the model, a recruit may voluntarily decide to participate
in monitoring — we use a random boolean generator to represent this.
Permission for private trade: In this simulation, we assume that per-
mission is granted if more than 70% in the board of directors agree to such a
decision (i.e. 8 out of 11).
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Furthermore, we parametrise the agents’ learning as follows. Agents discount
information using a weight of 30% for the past. This reflects the importance of
recent information for agents.
5 Results
In this section, we describe the simulation results considering four different com-
binations of two characteristics, namely a) environmental circumstances and b)
fairness of institutions. With two different values for each of these characteristics,
four combinations are possible (see Table 2).
Table 2. System specification based on different characteristics
Characteristics
E0F0
(EIC)
E0F1 E1F0
E1F1
(Julfa)
Environment 7 7 3 3
Fairness 7 3 7 3
The configurations (i.e. societies) are identified by the first letter of the char-
acteristics, namely E and F that are representatives of the environmental char-
acteristic of (E) and fairness of the institutions (F), respectively. A tick indicates
that the society possesses such an attribute, and a cross indicates the society
does not possess such an attribute. In this table, we gradually change character-
istics of the EIC (E0F0) to get closer to Julfa (E1F1), to examine their effects
on the success of these societies. We utilised NetLogo to perform our simulations
[33]. We also used 30 different runs for each set-up and then averaged their re-
sults. Finally, note that the patterns observed in simulation results are compared
to the patterns reported from the EIC and Jufla, because we had access to the
qualitative data.
5.1 Permissions for private trade
Table 3 presents the percentage of simulation runs (out of 30) where the per-
mission for private trade was granted (see row “Permission granted”). Note that
this change in rule (granting of permission) happened due to changes in agents’
meta-roles where a mercantile agent progresses to the board of directors (and
advocates the decision to permit private trade). As can be seen from the re-
sults, both unfair societies (FO) had higher percentage of runs where the private
trade is permitted (> 50%), although with a large difference (93% and 57%
respectively). In fair societies, none of the runs resulted in private trade being
approved. This result mirrors the evidence from Julfa. In Julfa, mercantile agents
(W) and peripheral managers (K) were the ones who eventually ran the family
business (C). Also, mercantile agents and managers made decisions regarding vi-
olations and acted as juries in certain courts [4]. The aforementioned situation,
combined with keeping private trade illegal [22], indicate that this rule was so-
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cially accepted.5 Also, we know that in the EIC, the permission for private trade
was granted once the managers had the opportunity to be part of the board of
directors[15].
Table 3. Percentage of runs where private trade was permitted (out of 30 runs).
Societies Permission granted for private trade
E0F0 (EIC) 93%
E0F1 0%
E1F0 57%
E1F1 (Julfa) 0%
0
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Societies E0F0 E1F0 E0F1 E1F1Fig. 3. Monitoring strength and firing in simulated societies.
5.2 Fired violators (monitoring strength)
Now we discuss the impact of aforementioned two characteristics on the monitor-
ing strength of the system (see Figure 3). Figures 3a-3d present the percentage
of the cheating agents fired. In these figures, the y-axis indicates the percentage
of fired cheaters. As can be seen, the most fired agents belong to society E1F1
and then E0F1. These indicate the importance of fairness of institutions on the
system’s monitoring strength.
5 Because in none of the simulation runs of Julfa the permission was granted, we
believe that using a similar dynamics to Julfa would not change the results
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This impact that we see in Figure 3 is a consequence of two informal roles
performed by agents, namely a) mercantile agents (W) that monitor and report
suspicious behaviours (internalised K) to managers (formal K), and b) managers
(K) who interpret rules based on the situations and tolerate some behaviours
(S). For example, managers who think the system isn’t fair, may not report
the cheating behaviour of agents (agents who are involved in private trades).
And these same managers who become a part of the board of directors allow
for these private trades to happen legally (but with the reduction in wages
further, though). Also, in organisations with unfair institutions, after granting
permissions for private trade (year 70), agents’ collaboration in monitoring the
cheaters (for theft etc.) decreases. Note that the evidence for interpretation of
the rules can be found in EIC managers’ correspondence6. Also, these results
mirror the evidence of rare cheating and successful monitoring mechanisms in
Julfa [4] and the popularity of cheating and collusion in the EIC [11].
6 Discussion and concluding remarks
This study has presented an extension of the BDI cognitive architecture to in-
vestigate its interaction with agents meta-roles. Also, using this extension, the
study has investigated the impact of a combination of a) dynamics in agents’
roles and b) the institutional characteristics (i.e. mortality rate and fairness)
on organisational rule dynamics (i.e. change of rule). As the role of individuals
changes (e.g. W to K), their beliefs formed based in their previous role impacts
their new decisions. Finally, our study has used the evidence from empirical stud-
ies to simulate two historical long-distance trading societies, namely Armenian
merchants of new Julfa (Julfa) and the English East India Company (EIC) and
has demonstrated what may cause rule changes (i.e. role change and institutional
characteristics).
The simulation results mirrored historical evidence. It has shown that the
fairness of institutions is a pivotal characteristic to drive their stability (i.e. avoid-
ing revisions in rules) and in facilitating agents’ collaboration in monitoring each
other’s behaviours. These results (i.e. changes in rules and weak monitoring and
reporting) mirror concerns in the modern context about the division of “rules
into the two categories of rules-in-use and rules-in-form” [31]. For instance, it is
noted that rules-in-use (followed rules) in some provinces of Canada might have
been rules-in-forms (unfollowed rules that do not have any effect on behaviour)
in others [31]. There exist some obstacles in a law in becoming a rule-in-use [12].
An instance of this obstacle is the activities of monitoring agents who interpret
the law differently and thus hamper its effectiveness (e.g. through not monitor-
ing violations) and hence can aid the formation of new rules similar to what has
been observed in results from Table 3 and Figure 3.
6 For instance, in the early years, some managers defended mercantile agents’ private
trade by stating: “if some tolleration [sic] for private trade be not permitted none
but desperate men will sail our ships” [11].
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A future extension of the study, will involve detailed examination of the inter-
action between other modules of the cognitive architecture presented in Figure
1. Also, the simulation can be extended to take account of other characteristics
of these historical societies, such as the personalities of agents, to provide a more
fine-grained model.
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